Abstract

Despite being strong, arguments for animal rights often fail to motivate. One reason for this is that rights are associated with concepts, such as respect, that are difficult to apply to nonhuman animals. These concepts are difficult to apply because they are implicitly grounded in the special status of humans. Respect for persons includes an element of reverence-based respect. The human/animal dichotomy is reinforced by cultural forces and farming practices that strip nonhuman animals of individuality and render their lives mundane, invisible, and uninteresting. To facilitate progress towards justice for nonhuman animals, this article proposes cultivating and safeguarding an attitude of wonder towards individual animals. Feelings of wonder, it is argued, have the potential to spark a shift in moral perspective and ground a form of reverence-based respect for nonhuman animals.

https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/japp.70040

When I first encountered slaughterhouse vigils, I thought them a somewhat pointless & self-indulgent form of protest. But, as thinking carefully & reading accounts, I changed my mind. I now think these protests can send a powerful signal about the moral status of nonhuman animals. They do this by signalling that the suffering & death of nonhuman animals can be worthy of grief & attention.

Despite changing my mind about slaughterhouse vigils, I still think the commonest form, practiced by the Animal Save Movement, is too broad & demanding. In large part, this is because it has its roots in the idea of Christian witness. My paper develops a secular form of witnessing to address this.

The paper: ‘Bearing witness, animal rights and the slaughterhouse vigil’ is open access: journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10…. I also wrote a short summary for the Vegan Society, which is here: https://www.vegansociety.com/get-involved/research/research-news/vigils-and-witnessing-animal-rights-activism

Abstract

For some, cultured animal products ought to be celebrated for the potential they offer to replace factory farming. Others argue that, for the same reason, there is a duty to support their production and consumption. This paper argues that the ethical status of cultured animal products ought to be assessed not just in comparison with factory farming, but also in terms of its potential to bring about interspecies justice. The claim is made that the attitudes embodied within cultured animal products show a lack of proper respect for nonhuman animals and are at odds with those required by justice. Although cultured animal products have the potential to greatly reduce harms done to nonhuman animals, this paper argues that their adoption ought to nevertheless be regarded with some regret. Using a Rawlsian framework for assessing transitional steps towards justice, the paper shows that, whilst the adoption of cultured animal products may be permissible, the case for regarding it as a duty is much weaker. For cultured meats to be permissible, it must first be shown that alternatives that respect the value of nonhuman animals as ends-in-themselves do not exist.

https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/mopp-2023-0088/html